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Recent years have witnessed a general backlash against 
identity politics, both in the academy and the public 
sphere. This paper recognises the problems in identity 
politics as arising from an apparent difficulty in 
conceptualising identity separately from notions 
of fixity and exclusion. It argues that politicised identities 
could, instead, be premised upon an explicit affirmation 
of the provisionality of political identity that is oriented 
to a “tomorrow “ in which the identity will no longer 
be required. 
[M]e and you, we got more yesterday than anybody. We need some 
kind of tomorrow.
– Toni Morrison, Beloved, p 273.
The quotation with which this article begins comes from the end of the novel where the character Paul D is speak-ing to fellow former slave Sethe of the need to move be-
yond the terms of a past disfi gured by slavery. We begin with this 
for two reasons. First, it expresses the central problematic ad-
dressed within this article: the question of the place of history in 
the present, and how this helps or hinders the opening up of 
f uture possibilities. Second, the novel addresses how the opening 
up of a new future can also be achieved by shifts in understand-
ing which result from allowing alternative interpretations of the 
past. Specifi cally in Beloved, Paul D moves from a condemnation 
of Sethe for her alleged inhumanity in having killed her own 
child (“you got two legs, not four, Sethe” ((1987) 1997: 165)), to a 
new understanding of the “gendered division of labour on which 
slavery was built” (Mohanty 2000: 61) and thus to acceptance of 
the validity of her claims to have killed as a human being, and as 
a mother (to save her own child from becoming a slave like her-
self, to refuse to be a reproducer of slaves). As such, Paul D a rrives 
at a fuller understanding of their shared historical experience as 
slaves, and this new knowledge constitutes the basis for develop-
ing the “tomorrow” of which he speaks.
In what follows we use the metaphor of “tomorrow” in order to 
address contemporary debates about “identity politics”. Recent 
years have witnessed a general backlash against identity politics 
both in the academy and the public sphere (Bickford 1997, Young 
1997, Farred 2000, Bramen 2002). Among the various pro-
tagonists of this “backlash”, Bramen (2002) gives particular atten-
tion to work by Wendy Brown (1995) on “wounded attachments”. 
This is her term for a condition in which politicised identities, 
based upon experiences of injustice and discrimination, begin to 
“fetishise” (Ahmed 2004) their own wounding. For Brown, this 
results in a reactionary politics aimed at recrimination, instead of 
action to redress the injustice. Our intention in the present article 
is to situate ourselves within this debate about the value of iden-
tity politics as well as to engage with the specifi c issues raised by 
Brown’s work. We will argue that the objections to “identity” 
raised by Brown and others must be taken seriously, but that this 
need not lead to a wholesale abandonment of the politics of iden-
tity. Rather, we wish to demonstrate that the problem with identity 
politics is the way in which the “identity” very often comes to re-
place the “politics”. To avoid such a substitution, we argue that 
“identity” may be re-theorised as that which is continually pro-
duced and reproduced by political projects in the present, and on 
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the basis of a shared vision of the future. The argument of this arti-
cle is thus that politicised identities might instead be thought of in 
terms of an explicit affi rmation of the provisionality of a political 
identity that is oriented to a “tomorrow” in which the identity will 
no longer be required. In this way, the power of “identity” as a site 
of resistance is maintained, while ameliorating the conservative 
effects of the entrenched identities that Brown criticises. 
As such, this article also addresses the wider contemporary 
d ebate in emancipatory politics, which concerns the proper 
o rientation of radical politics in terms of the tense of political dis-
course. The key issue here is that of the extent to which political 
discourse should be focused around the past – on origins, memory, 
history, trauma and so forth – or the extent to which it should be 
future-oriented. Critics such as Brown (1995) and Grosz (2000) 
have expressed a fear that too great a weight upon the past has 
proved constraining for radical movements, and that an emphasis 
upon the future – the (more) just future that political action 
 intends to bring about – is required as a corrective to this (Ahmed 
2004). However, such a demand brings with it the vexed question 
of the place of memory, and specifi cally, the memorialising of pain 
and exclusion. As Brown’s own equivocation on the i ssue suggests, 
“the counsel of forgetting [...] seems inappropriate if not cruel” 
(p 74) for many oppressed groups who have yet to have their pain 
recognised, or to understand t hemselves the deferred effects of a 
traumatic past (Kilby 2002).
The arguments presented in this paper are threefold. First, we 
argue for a rethinking of “politicised identities” in terms of a com-
mitment to a desired future, as a corrective to the conservative 
e ffects that frequently accompany “identity” (here identifi ed as 
“exclusionary politics” and “reifi cation of identities”). Second, we 
argue, however, that such an emphasis upon the future need not 
and should not entail an abandonment of the commitment to 
a ddress traumatic pasts. Third, we argue that a productive identity 
politics is one which understands the identity of the political group-
ing as provisional, since it is based on the need to respond to an 
existing injustice, and therefore, oriented to a future in which that 
injustice, and hence, the need for the identity claim, is no longer pre-
sent. Central to the development of our thesis will be an e ngagement 
with work on experience and identity by Satya Mohanty, and com-
munities and knowledge by Lynn Hankinson Nelson.
This is, then, a primarily theoretical argument; however, we 
will make reference to examples of particular forms of emancipa-
tory politics from the long-standing feminist movements and the 
more recent struggles against the oppression of dalits. Finally, 
the article will take an interdisciplinary approach to the issues of 
identity, interpretation, politics and community. As researchers 
in sociology and literary studies respectively, we are committed 
to the view that these disciplines are mutually informing, and 
that imaginative fi ction is one of the greatest resources a society 
has for the extending of sympathies and building of solidarities 
around urgent issues of political emancipation.
1 Exclusionary Politics
It is inexcusable to build analyses of historical experience around 
e xclusions, exclusions that stipulate, for instance, that only women 
can understand feminine experience, only Jews can u nderstand 
J ewish suffering, only formerly colonial subjects can understand 
c olonial e xperience (Said 1993: 35).
The idea of a politics underpinned by solidarities based on 
“sameness” has a long history in the critical tradition. Marx’s ini-
tial conceptualisation of the standpoint of the proletariat (albeit, 
signifi cantly different from those of subsequent developments of 
standpoint epistemology) has been used by feminist theorists as 
well as those arguing for a post-colonial perspective in terms of 
the subaltern, and, more recently, for a dalit standpoint (Hart-
sock 1984, Guha 1983, Rege 1998, 2000). However, while u sing 
identity as the basis of political action has been seen to be power-
ful (and effective), it has also increasingly become seen as prob-
lematic. The exclusionary politics of movements such as black 
power, much radical and lesbian feminism, and latterly, move-
ments for ethnic purity and/or religious integrity, for example, 
have yielded a deep concern with the programme of separation 
and isolationism that such movements are often seen to be based 
upon. For many critics, more troubling still has been the usually 
accompanying claim that only women can be feminists, or only 
black people can work against racism, or only dalits against caste 
oppression, and so on.
A position which states that only those who have experienced 
an injustice can understand and thus act effectively upon it seems 
to rest upon an essentialist theory of identity which assumes that 
the possibility of knowledge about particular situations is res-
tricted to one’s possession of the relevant (seemingly) irreducible 
traits (being female, black, dalit, and so forth). Arguably, one 
consequence of these separatist tendencies is that they perpetu-
ate the individualist fallacy that oppressive social relationships 
can be reformed by particular subjects without the broader 
agreement of others who, together, constitute the social relations 
within which the injustices are embedded. But even where the 
limitations of a purely exclusionary form of identity politics are 
recognised, many theorists continue, nevertheless, to argue for a 
form of “strategic essentialism” (Fuss 1989, Spivak 2003) sug-
gesting that where structures of inequality overlap with catego-
ries of identity, then a politics based on those identities is both 
liberatory and necessary (Bramen 2002).
In our view, however, the claim for a “strategic essentialism” 
remains fraught with problems, for at least three reasons. First, it 
establishes an epistemological division between those who assert 
a particular identity in advancing political claims and the 
o bserver who is sympathetic to those claims but “recognises” the 
limitations of basing such claims on a putative identity.1 There is 
something highly problematic in claiming to support a political 
movement from the basis of being able to “see” something that 
the individuals constituting the movement do not see, and in 
then not engaging with them with regard to this. This sets the 
observer up in a privileged position vis-à-vis other members of 
the movement and thus makes solidarity diffi cult to achieve.2 
Second, the claim for “strategic essentialism” posits solidarity, 
that is, collective identifi cation around a particular standpoint, 
as a prerequisite for collective action to address perceived injus-
tices. This is as against recognising that solidarities can also 
emerge through the actions taken to correct particular injustices 
and can include those who recognise the injustice as the reason 
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for action while not directly being disadvantaged themselves. 
Third, the assertion of “strategic essentialism” generally occurs 
in the context of claiming justice through an appeal to the wider 
community but with no explanation as to why the wider commu-
nity ought to honour this claim for justice, especially when it is 
often not deemed possible for them to constitute a part of the 
movement itself. There is a requirement of inclusivity then – in 
terms of demanding acceptance of the validity of the claims 
made – at the same time, as an assertion of its impossibility 
across what are posited as irreducible, essential traits (for a fuller 
discussion see Holmwood 1995).
The arguments of this paper start out from a broad agreement 
that developing a politics from the basis of occupying a particular 
social position or having a specifi c (singular) identity is problem-
atic for the reasons identifi ed above, as well as for covertly legiti-
mating – “absolving and forgiving”, in Said’s (1993: 35) words – 
the ignorance of those whose understanding and actions are nec-
essary for countering social injustices. It has to be recognised 
that issues exist between people and are not in people: that is, 
problems of social injustice occur in the relationships through 
which subjectivities are produced and thus, all those implicated 
in those relationships are involved in their address. For example, 
sexism is not a problem for women to deal with alone, but is a 
problem situated in the contemporary relationships of social and 
material inequalities and requires mutual engagement for its 
a ddress. This is an address which we consider is best served by the 
solidarities generated as a consequence of the activities around 
perceived injustices (that is, solidarities generated through the 
political movements of people working towards equality, justice) 
as opposed to those activities having to rely on assumed pre- 
existing solidarities (that is, being female, gay, black, dalit, etc). 
This is not an argument for movements against specifi c injustices 
or inequalities to be subsumed within a wider (say, socialist) 
movement but, rather, an argument for movements to be 
c onceived inclusively as movements where membership is not 
r estricted to those presumed to suffer the injustice or inequality.
As such, a question arises as to what would happen if the 
“identity” in “identity politics” were rethought along the lines of 
the solidarities that are generated around the address of injus-
tices rather than the solidarity that is presumed to ensue from 
being the victim of an injustice. Defending “identity” against a 
variety of critiques from the academic left, Bramen (2002) a sserts 
that identity can also be productive in its construction of moral 
and other communities. Our question, however, would be why 
such communities – sites of resistance and the discovery of politi-
cal agency – need to be constructed around essentialising rheto-
ric and restricted (this is the implication) to those who suffer the 
injustice. Indeed, Bramen herself recognises that “identity poli-
tics certainly has its limitations, primarily in terms of prescribing 
modes of behaviour that pressure individuals to conform to cer-
tain standards of authenticity” (2002: 7-8). And this surely is a 
real problem; that essentialist rhetoric establishes belonging to a 
community, and thus identity, on the basis of presumed shared 
attributes or experiences that are imagined to be irreducible. As 
such, not only may the community itself become oppressive to 
those who do not share those attributes, or who wish to articulate 
experiences that differ from those expressed by the majority, but 
the community itself may be weakened in its resistance to other 
forms of oppression by the distraction of its internal policing 
against difference. 
We suggest that alternative models of identity and community 
are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and 
that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya 
M ohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000) 
post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way 
through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the e xcesses 
of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a 
proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 
2000), identities must be understood as theoretical constructions 
that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, 
substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explana-
tions of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. 
Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive 
– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning 
and signifi cance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is 
always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced 
(Scott 1991). 
Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who 
s imilarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning or 
k nowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of 
knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the 
“death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology, 
N elson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the 
agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible 
for an individual to know something that another individual 
could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make 
sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks 
and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and 
repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as 
theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on episte-
mological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of 
the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu-
als in the context of the communities within which they exist.
The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary 
here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the 
processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises 
about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident 
knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” 
the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the expe-
rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a 
feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to 
understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary 
to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the 
identifi cation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact 
of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being 
designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achieve-
ment” – that is, something worked towards through a process of 
analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First, 
that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some-
thing that is “achievable” by men.3
While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical 
or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one 
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p erson to another with transparency, we think that there is some-
thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only 
understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has 
actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to 
privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or 
then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity poli-
tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or 
organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to 
understand an experience one has not had, then what point is 
there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view 
seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of 
disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive respon-
sibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. 
Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi-
ence of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white 
feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of 
black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole 
r esponsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). 
Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in 
terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call 
for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the pre-
ferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the 
m arginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” 
to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” 
struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that 
enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. 
Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate 
the understanding of experiences, thus making those experi-
ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while 
r ecognising that they are not equally available or powerful for 
all  subjects.4 
Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we 
suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them 
as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, 
overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or 
that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding 
avoids what Bramen identifi es as the postmodern excesses of 
“post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“rac-
ism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: 
a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what 
he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American” 
(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, 
as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological com-
munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself 
in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that 
are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recog-
nised by particular communities as valid in order to be success-
ful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of 
essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the commu-
nities that confer identity are constituted through their shared 
epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared char-
acteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible.5 Hence, 
the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-
selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed 
upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations 
b etween the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing 
the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same 
experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or 
postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated 
with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000).
We believe that it is the identifi cation of injustice which calls 
forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy soli-
darities.6 While it is accepted that there may be important differ-
ences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage 
while being, in some respects, its benefi ciary (for example, men, 
white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice 
from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, 
dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political 
commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differ-
ences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity 
claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological 
communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its asso-
ciated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation 
in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to 
notions of fi xed characteristics – the focus is on the activities indi-
viduals participate in rather than the characteristics they are 
deemed to possess. Identity is thus defi ned further as a function 
of activity located in particular social locations (understood as 
the complex of objective forces that infl uence the conditions in 
which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995: 
109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not 
be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very 
real actions, practices and projects.
2 The Reification of Identity
We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politics 
that can be best described as the problem of the reifi cation of 
p oliticised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within the 
debate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the 
wounded character of politicised identity’s desire” (ibid: 55); that 
is, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to 
identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and 
perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity 
claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is 
founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion 
itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that 
identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and 
reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than 
– and indeed, often in opposition to – resolving the injurious 
s ocial relations that generated claims around that identity in the 
fi rst place. If things have to have a history in order to have a 
f uture, then the problem becomes that of how history is con-
structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, 
identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future 
for that identity is then already determined by the injury “as both 
bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the 
present which embodies that history” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s sug-
gestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus back-
wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe, 
too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. 
Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its 
unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from 
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an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). 
Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of 
the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and re-
ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those 
ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identi-
ties, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment and 
inequality, then become invested in their own impotence through 
practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. 
These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are 
s ubstitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. 
Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suf-
fering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the estab-
lishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue” (ibid 1995: 
70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimi-
nation. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to – 
in fact, provide obstacles to – practices that would seek to dispel 
the conditions of exclusion.
Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choice 
between past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts the 
adoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer 
of history” (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat-
ing different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thing 
that the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”. 
Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of the 
past, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spec-
tator” mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The one 
hope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery 
over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannot 
be altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to de-
termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, 
Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of 
human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous 
decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment 
– that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break out 
of the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present against 
the terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of 
that past. An act of liberation, of self-affi rmation, this “forgetting 
of the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers iden-
tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in which 
identity is to be defi ned differently.
In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a posi-
tion that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as re-
siding in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby 
2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices and 
suffering. While we agree that investment in identities prem-
ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating 
the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument 
as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we 
share a concern about any turn to the future that is fi gured as a 
complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those 
who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to 
give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel 
and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn 
to the future” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz call 
for, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, 
need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. 
Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, 
stating that
[since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such 
integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities 
[then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed 
N ietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). 
She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in pain 
may be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain through 
recognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge 
– is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised into 
self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, 
and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish 
the political importance of remembering “painful” historical 
events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering 
pain is to enable its release. The challenge then, according to her, 
is to create a political culture in which this project does not 
m utate into one of remembering pain for its own sake. 
Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought 
to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suit-
able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writ-
ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember-
ing is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who 
is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past 
she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau-
matic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember in 
order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the 
present.7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for the 
dilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002), 
i nsisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the hold 
of the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved 
without fi rst remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this would 
seem to be similar to the message of Beloved, whose central motif 
of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murdered 
child returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of the 
unanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, as 
it does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow-
ing the possibility of a future different from that past.
As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to 
break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attach-
ments that are hurtful, we must fi rst bring them into the realm of 
political action” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys-
ing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of 
p olitical action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on 
their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community” of par-
ticipants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of remembering 
and interpreting the objective social conditions that made up that 
past and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is 
not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from 
o bjective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part, 
forms of injustice and inequality into the present. 
In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past and 
future. In the example of Beloved with which we began this 
a rticle, Paul D’s acceptance of Sethe’s experiences of slavery as 
distinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under-
standings of their experience. Such understanding is a way of 
partially “undoing” the (effects of) the past and coming to terms 
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with the locatedness of one’s being in the world (Mohanty 1995). 
As this example shows, opening up a future, and attending to the 
ongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly under-
stood as alternatives.
A second set of problems with Brown’s critique of identity poli-
tics emerge from what we regard as her tendency to individualise 
social problems as problems that are the possession and the 
r esponsibility of the “wounded” group. Brown suggests that the 
problems associated with identity politics can be overcome 
through a “shift in the character of political expression and politi-
cal claims common to much politicised identity” (1995: 75). She 
defi nes this shift as one in which identity would be expressed in 
terms of desire rather than of ontology by supplanting the lan-
guage of “I am” with the language of “I want this for us” (1995: 
75). Such a reconfi guration, she argues, would create an opportu-
nity to “rehabilitate the memory of desire within identifi catory 
processes…prior to [their] wounding” (1995: 75). It would fur-
ther refocus attention on the future possibilities present in the 
identity as opposed to the identity being foreclosed through its 
attention to past-based grievances. 
What is problematic here is that Brown’s conception of the “us” 
in “I want this for us” appears to leave open the possibility that 
the “us” both precedes and succeeds the want and its fulfi lment 
in the manner of a more or less stable identity. The logic of 
Brown’s argument itself, however, would suggest that the “us” 
which has been produced by the want need not exist in the same 
way once this want has been fulfi lled since the initial conditions 
of its emergence have altered. There is an ambiguity here in 
Brown that requires clarifi cation particularly in relation to the 
following. Despite Brown’s insistence that the “I want” “distin-
guishes itself from a liberal expression of self-interest by virtue of 
its fi guring of a political or collective good as its desire” (1995: 
75), her references to Nietzschean notions of “self-overcoming” 
risk individualising, albeit in collective form, both the problem 
and the potential solutions. In other words, she appears to sug-
gest that injured identities are the “property” of stable, singular 
collectivities and that the problems they face can be overcome in 
isolation, without an engagement with others. This is especially 
problematic to the extent that it could be appropriated as a way of 
placing responsibility for the failure to advance socially at the 
hands of the group suffering, and not with the wider communi-
ties who are complicit in maintaining the conditions of that suf-
fering. Here we fi nd ourselves in sympathy with Bramen, who 
notes the
similarity of this left critique with the conservative behaviouralist’s 
dismissal of black victimage. Pull yourself up by your own bootstraps. 
Don’t be a victim but an agent of change (2002: 4). 
As Bramen notes, such slogans, and Brown’s own emphasis 
upon self-overcoming, “do not address the structural dynamics 
that continue to victimise and impoverish targeted communities” 
(2002: 4). Indeed, we would argue there is a signifi cant danger in 
Brown’s argument of appropriation by right wing positions, a 
danger exacerbated by the absence of specifi c empirical analysis 
in her chapter. By not specifying which movements she is charac-
terising as “ressentiment” ones, Brown allows this charge to be 
adopted and levelled at potentially any group. 
Conclusion: The Need for a Tomorrow
Social constructionist understandings of identity are often taken 
to be antithetical to forms of essentialism. However, to the extent 
that identities, even on the social constructionist account, are 
u nderstood to be self-referential, they are therefore, posited in 
terms of a supposed internal coherence, rather than being about 
engaging with others, learning, and potentially changing. In this 
case, we would argue, coherence can then be seen as a form of 
essentialism. Brown’s understanding of identity as obtaining “a 
unifying coherence” (1995: 65), for example, does not acknowl-
edge that it is the very attempt to create coherence that can lead 
to the removal of opportunities for dialogue within and across 
communities. If something is coherent, in its own terms, there is 
no overlap with others and no engagement with what is present 
or missing. Lack of integration, or dissension, can then appear to 
the identity group as an external “threat” to the identity in ques-
tion, as opposed to being a measure of dialogue within and 
b etween communities making particular identity claims. This is, 
we believe, an unacknowledged danger haunting Brown’s 
a ccount, since the “us” that she identifi es in her examination of 
politicised identities is the specifi c “us” which is directly suffer-
ing. This focus on the specifi c “us” does not acknowledge the 
wider “us” who might potentially be engaged with the relief of 
that suffering; that is, Brown does not recognise here the over-
lapping epistemological communities that make up any “us”. The 
absence of such recognition is logically contradictory, since any 
claim to suffering is always implicitly an appeal to others to 
r ecognise their implication in its conditions. 
Political mobilisation around suffering engenders solidarities 
between those who are suffering and those who afford recogni-
tion of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffer 
generally claim their common humanity with others in asking for 
people to look beyond the specifi c circumstances of their suffer-
ing, and in doing so, the request is to address those specifi c 
c ircumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the 
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c ircumstances. The mistake of some forms of identity politics, 
then, is to associate identity with suffering. While a recognition 
of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect 
of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of 
suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. 
 “Wounded attachments”, we would argue, do not represent 
the general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob-
lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (or 
a ccept) the processes of change associated with movements. The 
accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar 
i ssues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi-
tions which generated the identity (and the associated move-
ment) in the fi rst instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on 
identity then successful reform (even partial reform) reduces the 
injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based 
upon that injury. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in 
terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those 
within the movement who would wish the reforms to go further 
and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they 
believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. As they can 
no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated 
s uffering – as common to all (and thus requiring address because 
of its generalised effect), there is often, then, a perceived need to 
privilege that suffering as particular and to institute a politics of 
guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment. 
The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political 
a ction being constituted through pre-existing identities and soli-
darities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was 
recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or 
achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality 
within society then reforms could be seen as steps towards equal-
ity. A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of which 
gender justice is an integral aspect) would allow for provisional 
reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into 
question the basis for the movement – for there would always be 
more to be achieved.8 Each achievement would itself necessitate 
further revision of what equality would look like. And it would 
also necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the 
“identity” afforded by participating in that movement. In this 
way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, 
in part at least, about participating in a series of dialogues about 
what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of 
s ocial  justice. 
Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be 
t omorrow, based on an understanding of where we are today, 
would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats. 
It is only if one believes that political action can only o ccur in the 
context of identifi cation of past injustices as opposed to future jus-
tice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms in the present. 
Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its 
injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to 
the ossifi cation of injured relations. The “wounded attachment” oc-
curs when the politicised identity can see no f uture without the in-
jury also constituting an aspect of that f uture. Developing on the 
work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a “reformed” 
identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future, but 
that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in 
the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-
nist movement, for instance, would mean that feminists no longer 
existed, as the conditions that caused people to become feminist 
had been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success 
would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of “dalit” as a 
salient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.
As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) and 
N elson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one’s own 
and other’s experiences into knowledge about the world, in the 
context of communities that negotiate epistemological premises, 
which confers a notion of politicised identity. Since it is an under-
standing of “tomorrow” (what that would be, and how it is to be 
achieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such 
an identity claim does not exclude others from participation, and 
it does not solicit the reifi cation of identity around the fact of his-
torical or contemporary suffering. By removing these obstacles to 
progress, the “tomorrow” that is the goal, is more readily achiev-
able. Identity politics, then, “needs a tomorrow” in this sense: 
that the raison d’être of any politicised identity is the bringing 
about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present 
have been overcome. But identity politics also needs that tomor-
row – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to 
i nscribe that tomorrow into their self-defi nition in the present, in 
order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of 
the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that gen-
erated it. That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-
defi nition of one’s political identity, is one in which that identity 
will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since 
it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice. 
Notes
1  Here, we are thinking of instances where aca-
demics and intellectuals lend support to move-
ments whose aims, in another context, they 
would (and have) disagree with. One notable 
e xample being Edward W Said’s support for Pales-
tinian nationalism existing in a paradoxical rela-
tionship with his commitment to cosmopolitan-
ism (on this, see Bhambra 2006).
2  For further discussion of the issues associated with 
standpoint epistemology, see Bhambra 2007: 27-33.
3   To give an example, imagine a scenario in which a 
woman attempts to explain to a man the experi-
ence of receiving unwanted sexual attention in 
the street. What is required for this experience to 
be “understood” by the man could perhaps be as 
follows. First, that this experience is judged 
w orthy of attention and interpretation and is not 
dismissed as “trivial” or as a matter of being 
“oversensitive”. Second, that the man shares with 
the woman certain theoretical premises about the 
s ociety they are in, which may include most 
o bviously the premise that it is a society in which 
citizens are treated unequally according to gen-
der. Further premises may include that a domi-
nant cultural understanding of women is that 
they are of value to the extent that they are 
judged sexually desirable to men. A common way 
in which this valuation of women is enforced is 
through such acts, which far from being trivial or 
even fl attering, are ways of interpellating women 
into a subject-position that is implicitly inferior to 
men. Through agreeing to process and make 
sense of the woman’s “experience” through a 
broadly-shared epistemological paradigm, in the 
manner suggested above, it is possible for the 
man to “understand” the experience in the sense 
of coming to a recognition of the emotions pro-
duced, the effects of such an incident, and its 
broader societal causes and implications. Indeed, 
he may be able to assist with the process by which 
the woman herself makes sense of this experi-
ence, and her feelings around it, by contributing 
to this processing of experience into knowledge 
his own experiences of being interpellated as 
male in society.
4   One of the social processes that we consider 
i mportant is that of narrative fi ction which invites 
identifi cation with subject positions and experi-
ences that may be radically different from the 
reader’s own. Narrative is not only essential to the 
construction of identity, it also provides a vehicle 
for the communication of experiences across 
d ifferent identities. 
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5   “Black”, for example, has been used as a political 
category by mixed, coloured, African, Indian, 
West Indian, Pakistani and other ethnic groups 
both in Britain in the 1970s and in South Africa 
during the anti-apartheid struggles.
6   The philosopher of medicine Georges Canguil-
hem ([1943] 1991) argues that the health of a bio-
logical organism is given by the provisionality of 
its norms and its openness to their future revi-
sion. Perhaps, solidarities and communities can 
be said to be healthy to the extent to which their 
norms for understanding experiences and pro-
ducing knowledge are open to revision in the light 
of new claims. Where communities are resistant 
to change – such that they refuse to countenance 
any revision of identity claims, for example, they 
could be termed pathological in Canguilhem’s 
terms. For, if it is “coherence” that one requires, 
then dissension is interpreted as a threat, rather 
than as the opportunity for reformulating norms, 
principles, or ways of perceiving and making 
sense of the world (for further discussion see 
M argree 2002).
7   Enumerating the ways in which a traumatic expe-
rience is forgotten, or loses its power, Freud and 
Breuer ([1893] 1991) mention two of particular 
importance: there is “association”, whereby a 
traumatic event (such as an accident) gets associ-
ated with more reassuring ideas (such as being 
rescued); and “abreaction”, whereby the psychic 
energy generated in reaction to trauma achieves 
release through expression by word or gesture. 
The crucial point is that these processes can only 
take place if the traumatic memory is present to 
consciousness. If the memory is instead uncon-
scious, then the procedures of forgetting cannot 
take place and the patient is doomed to “remem-
ber” instead through the language of the hysteri-
cal body, and her “present” is reduced to being a 
repetition of the past.
8   In arguing for the necessary dissolution of political 
identities we are not suggesting that political 
i dentities per se will disappear as we believe that 
there are always likely to be new issues that arise as 
present ones are resolved (nor are we claiming that 
politicised identities are the only form of identity). 
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